The Iowa Public Information Board
COMES NOW, Charissa Flege, Deputy Director for the Iowa Public Information Board (“IPIB”), and enters this Investigative Report:
On March 11, 2026, Chelsea Plaster (“Complainant”) filed formal complaint 26FC:0071, alleging that the City of Davenport Public Works (“Respondent”) violated Iowa Code Chapter 22.
The Iowa Public Information Board accepted this complaint at its meeting on April 16, 2026.
Facts
This matter arose in response to a vehicle tow by the City of Davenport. The interaction between the city employee and the member of the public was captured on a body camera device. The device did not belong to the city, but was purchased and used by the employee for his own protection against allegations that may be made against him in the course of his duties.
On March 4, 2026, the Complainant submitted a records request to the Respondent for “body cam footage [] of neighborhood services enforcer officer number 18347, on 02/17/2026 between 12pm and 1pm.” Emails provided from the same day show that an analyst for the city reached out to another employee seeking the requested video. Other emails show that the analyst communicated with the tow officer on March 4th and 5th to retrieve the recording. On March 9th, the analyst emailed the deputy city clerk:
I tried attaching the only footage we could retrieve from [the officer’s] body cam. Unfortunately, he had a longer clip that he downloaded onto a pin drive but when he tried to put on the computer, the drive was wiped clean. I only have the short clip that I tried to attach.
The deputy city clerk then asked whether the footage was “gone from the body cam too?” The analyst replied, “yes, he said it was removed when he put it on the drive.” In response to this investigation, the tow officer submitted a sworn affidavit that aligned with the timeline of events reflected in the email exchanges.
On March 10, 2026, the Complainant was notified that the records request was complete and she could access the records. The same day she accessed it and then emailed the deputy city clerk to notify them she believed part of the video recording was missing and she wanted the entire thing. On March 11, 2026, the deputy city clerk answered, explaining that the recording was the totality of what was provided from the personal body cam from the employee to the city. In response to this email, Complainant contacted the city by phone and spoke to another employee. The second employee explained to the Complainant the tow officer had only sent a cut of the footage because of the size of the file. He then tried to save is on a thumb drive and bring it to work. When he inserted the thumb drive, it reformatted the drive and erased the file. Therefore, the only remaining record the city could retrieve was the portion that he had already sent before it was accidentally erased. The content of the conversation was recorded from Complainant’s contemporaneous notes submitted to IPIB. The Complainant filed case 26FC:0071 the same day.
According to the tow officer’s affidavit, the city attorney reached out to him on March 12th to ensure the file had been deleted. The tow officer then turned over the thumb drive to the city attorney to have IT attempt to recover the file. The city’s computer forensic unit supervisor also submitted an affidavit providing the detailed steps used to attempt to identify, restore, or retrieve the deleted file. According to that individual, the forensic software he used to work on the file showed fragmented data, which he testified would be consistent with a reformatted and partially overwritten file. Despite the employee’s best efforts, he was unable to restore the full recording.
The complaint initially alleged a violation by the city when they erased the recording, because they destroyed a requested record before producing it. She later expanded it to allege an unlawful delay in responding to the request, failure to update the requester on the status of the request in violation of Chapter 22, and eventually unlawful withholding of her second records request.
On March 17, 2026, Complainant submitted a second records request to the Respondent for “[a]ll emails or metadata related to PPR-142-2026 from neighborhood services personnel and other city personnel.” The records were provided by the city on March 26th; however, several documents had contact information withheld under 22.7(18) and emails with legal counsel were redacted because of attorney-client privilege. IPIB’s review of the production showed that each redacted document listed the legal basis for the withholding.
On March 28, 2026, Complainant sent another email to the deputy city clerk demanding a ‘Vaughan Index’ be provided. For all redacted documents, she wanted the index to include the “date and time of the communication,” “the sender and all recipients,” and “a statement as to why the underlying facts of the footage deletion cannot be segregated from the legal advice.” She concluded if such an index was not provided, she would “be forced” to file another formal complaint with IPIB. In response to this demand, the deputy city clerk re-reviewed each record and modified some of the redactions. IPIB staff reviewed the produced records as part of the investigation. The emails redacted for attorney-client privilege still displayed all of the email addresses and names of the participants to the email, the signature of the individual sending the email, the subject line of the email, and the time that the email was sent. The only redacted portion was the text in the body of some, but not all, of the emails that included the city attorney.
Rather than submitting another complaint, Complainant submitted her arguments under 26FC:0071 as to why the Respondent’s response to her second request was insufficient, namely that the city improperly redacted the second record production and that a “Vaughan Index” was required in order to comply with Respondent’s Chapter 22 obligations. For efficiency purposes, IPIB will address all of the Complainants arguments regarding both the March 4th and March 17th records requests under 26FC:0071. Complainant also made several civil evidentiary arguments; however, such matters are not covered by Chapter 21 or 22 and therefore are outside IPIB’s jurisdiction.
Applicable Law
“Every person shall have the right to examine and copy a public record and to publish or otherwise disseminate a public record or the information contained in a public record. Unless otherwise provided for by law, the right to examine a public record shall include the right to examine a public record without charge while the public record is in the physical possession of the custodian of the public record. The right to copy a public record shall include the right to make photographs or photographic copies while the public record is in the possession of the custodian of the public record. All rights under this section are in addition to the right to obtain a certified copy of a public record under section 622.46.” Iowa Code 22.3(1).
“Good faith, reasonable delay by a lawful custodian in permitting the examination and copying of a government record is not a violation of this chapter if the purpose of the delay is any of the following: (c) To determine whether the government record in question is a public record, or confidential record. (d) To determine whether a confidential record should be available for inspection and copying to the person requesting the right to do so. A reasonable delay for this purpose shall not exceed twenty calendar days and ordinarily should not exceed ten business days.” Iowa Code § 22.8(4)(c), (d).
“The following public records shall be kept confidential, unless otherwise ordered by a court, by the lawful custodian of the records, or by another person duly authorized to release such information:…(18) Communications not required by law, rule, procedure, or contract that are made to a government body or to any of its employees by identified persons outside of government, to the extent that the government body receiving those communications from such persons outside of government could reasonably believe that those persons would be discouraged from making them to that government body if they were available for general public examination. As used in this subsection, “persons outside of government” does not include persons or employees of persons who are communicating with respect to a consulting or contractual relationship with a government body or who are communicating with a government body with whom an arrangement for compensation exists…” Iowa Code 22.7(18).
“The following records may be kept confidential.… e. Records which constitute attorney work product, or attorney-client communications, or which are otherwise privileged. Attorney work product is confidential under Iowa Code sections 22.7(4), 622.10 and 622.11, Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.503(3), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), and case law. Attorney-client communications are confidential under Iowa Code sections 622.10 and 622.11, the rules of evidence, the Code of Professional Responsibility and case law.” Iowa Administrative Rule 497-7.11(2).
Analysis
Unreasonable Delay
Complainant alleges that the government engaged in an unreasonable delay and failed to provide sufficient updates to her, to such an extent it constitutes a violation of Chapter 22. She submitted two separate requests. The first, submitted on March 4th, was produced six days later on March 10th. The second, submitted on March 17th, was produced nine days later on March 26th—including the documents that required review and redaction for confidentiality.
Chapter 22 does not provide an explicit timeline for the production of public records. In 24AO:0010, Clarification on the Definition of “Reasonable Delay”, IPIB discussed six factors identified by the Iowa Supreme Court in Belin v. Reynolds for determining whether a government body has impliedly refused to disclose records during unreasonable delay, including 1) how promptly the respondent acknowledged the requests and follow-up inquiries, 2) whether the respondent assured the requester of their intent to provide the requested records, 3) whether the respondent explained why requested records weren’t immediately available, 4) whether the respondent produced records as they became available (“rolling production”), 5) whether the respondent updated the requester on efforts to obtain and produce records, and 6) whether the respondent provided information about when records could be expected. 989 N.W.2d 166, 174 (Iowa 2023)). Furthermore, the code explicitly allows an additional ten business days beyond the reasonable production time to “determine whether a confidential record should be available for inspection and copying to the person requesting the right to do so.” Iowa Code § 22.8(4)(d). That time would be in addition to the regular ‘reasonable’ time frame to search, collect, and copy or produce the records.
In the present matter, the Complainant received a receipt notice for her requests on the same day they were submitted through the online portal. All responsive records were produced in less than two weeks for both requests. The second request, which took longer to produce, was still fulfilled in fewer business days than the additional delay permitted by the Code for confidentiality review and redaction. Because the Respondent immediately acknowledged receipt of the requests and provided the records in an extremely timely manner, there was no need for ongoing communication regarding delays or rolling production. Nevertheless, all of Complainant’s questions or concerns communicated to the Respondent after receiving the production were promptly addressed by email, as evidenced by the communications provided to IPIB. Considering the facts and evidence produced here, there is no basis to find an unreasonable delay occurred in response to either request.
Destruction of Body Camera Footage
Public records are defined as “all records, documents, tape, or other information, stored or preserved in any medium, of or belonging to” the government body. Iowa Code § 22.1(3)(a). The definition of public record requires that the information must be “stored or preserved” in order to create a public record, meaning that records that previously existed, but are no longer “stored or preserved” at the time of a request are no longer public records subject to production under Chapter 22. Although there is no explicit language in Chapter 22 addressing the required length of public records retention, the right of “every person…to example and copy a public record and to publish or otherwise disseminate” the same, implies the government has a duty to facilitate production of public records that exist (are stored or preserved) at the time of the request in accordance with the law.
The employee communications submitted to IPIB indicate that the government body was not actually aware of the recording at issue when the request was received. However, in response to the request, the Respondent contacted the individual employee who possessed the recording and attempted to facilitate the transfer of the record from the individual’s personal body camera to a government computer. The tow officer, who owned the body camera, first attempted to send the complete recording over the internet, which, according to the Complainant, should have been more than 40 minutes long. Because of the size of the file, the tow officer clipped a portion of the recording and sent the smaller file to the analyst working on the request. He then transferred the full recording from his camera onto a thumb drive and brought the thumb drive to his work computer. When the computer prompted him to reformat the thumb drive because its formatting was incompatible, the tow officer accepted the prompt. The reformatting deleted the files on the thumb drive. As a result, a portion of the recording that existed on March 4, at the time of the request, was permanently destroyed, leaving the earlier partial clip sent over the internet as the only portion of the recording available for production. The Complainant alleges that this destruction, regardless of whether it was accidental, constitutes a violation of Chapter 22.
Chapter 22 does not require a government body to knowingly or intentionally act in violation of Chapter 22 for a violation to occur. However, the legal standard for finding a violation is not perfect compliance with Chapter 22, but substantial compliance with Chapter 22. See KCOB/KLVN, Inc. v. Jasper Cnty. Bd. of Sup'rs, 473 N.W.2d 171, 176 (Iowa 1991). Even when public records custodians carry out their responsibilities properly, accidents can happen—a basement may flood and destroy records, or a computer crash may result in the loss of records saved to a hard drive. These things can happen before or after a request is made. However, it seems incompatible with the substantial-compliance standard to find a violation of Chapter 22 when a custodian is attempting to carry out a production and a technological failure causes the loss or partial loss of a record in the process. That is a very different scenario from a government body purposefully deleting or destroying a record after a request has been made, which IPIB has indicated in the past could be a violation of Chapter 22. Outside of Complainant’s statement they believe the deletion was intentional, there is no evidence of bad faith on the part of the Respondent, either in their affidavits or the internal email communications that occurred about the file transfer after the request was made but before this complaint was filed. For this reason, the Respondent should be found substantially compliant by producing the entirety of the portion they were able to successfully transfer and save from the body camera.
Complainant also argued that the Respondent was negligent in their custodial duties because the transfer was not done by the deputy city clerk personally to ensure its success. However, there is no requirement in Chapter 22 as to how records “of or belonging to” the government but stored on the personal devices of employees are transferred to a government device. This is a known challenge with the technology saturated work environment we have today and it is one of the reasons why IPIB recommends the government body adopt their own policy for how they will deal with the use of personal devices in regards to Chapter 22 (including records transfer). However, the language of Chapter 22 has not changed at the same pace as technology has changed the way we do business day to day. As yet, the code has not imposed any specific requirements for how personal devices must be managed or transfers conducted. The Respondent’s custodian engaged in due diligence in contacting the employee and asking for him to send the recording to a government device in response to a public records request, and then subsequently utilizing computer forensic unit supervisor to attempt to restore the video.
Improper Withholding of Non-Confidential Records
Chapter 22 permits the government to redact confidential information from public records before producing the non-confidential portions. In this matter, the Respondent asserted confidentiality based upon 22.7(18) and attorney-client privilege.
Iowa Code § 22.7(18) permits the government to redact information that includes “[c]ommunications not required by law, rule, procedure, or contract that are made to a government body or to any of its employees by identified persons outside of government, to the extent that the government body receiving those communications from such persons outside of government could reasonably believe that those persons would be discouraged from making them to that government body if they were available for general public examination.” In reviewing the redacted records that relied on § 22.7(18), the Respondent redacted the following information from public-records requests submitted through its JustFOIA portal: the name, phone number, email address, street address, city, state, and ZIP code of the requesters. No other information was redacted. The time and date stamp, the name and email address of the government employee who received the communication, the description of the request, the number assigned to the request, the date the request was submitted, and the date it was due remained visible.
The Respondent applied § 22.7(18) narrowly, removing only information that would “identif[y] persons outside the government” who were communicating with the government body. The Respondent reasonably believed that individuals could be discouraged from submitting public-records requests if they believed their personal contact information would be “available for general public examination.” Under these circumstances, the redactions made pursuant to Iowa Code § 22.7(18) were proper.
The other batch of redacted records involved attorney-client communications relating to the ongoing dispute between the Respondent and the Complainant concerning the towing of the Complainant’s vehicle. Iowa’s administrative rules recognize the government’s right to withhold confidential attorney-client communications in response to a public-records request. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 497-7.11(2). Once the Complainant has shown that records were withheld, the rule places the legal burden on the government to demonstrate that its withholding was proper. At the time the IPIB investigation began, the Complainant’s appeal of the city’s determination in that matter was pending. In the original production, the Respondent provided the Complainant with the redacted confidential emails, which still displayed nearly all of the information she later demanded through a “Vaughan Index.”
Because the Respondent left the email headers unredacted, IPIB could see that the redacted communications were between city employees and the city’s legal counsel. Further, within the email strings, certain text blocks remained unredacted because legal counsel was not included in those portions of the conversations. The unredacted content preceding and following the redacted portions supports the Respondent’s assertion that the communications concerned confidential legal advice relating to the Complainant’s pending appeal. For example, one unredacted communication stated, “Can you let Fred’s no this is under appeal and other than releasing to the owner, do not auction off until they hear from us.” Another response stated, “Called Freds and asked them not to dispose of/auction off this camper.” Considered together, these factors support the Respondent’s burden to show that it withheld or redacted only confidential communications in which legal counsel was involved in providing legally protected legal advice to the Respondent and its employees.
The Complainant also asserted that the Respondent’s failure to provide a “Vaughan Index” when withholding attorney-client communications is, in and of itself, a violation of Chapter 22. There is no such requirement in Chapter 22. Even considering the Respondent’s burden to demonstrate to IPIB that it properly redacted or withheld public records, a “Vaughan Index” is only one method of many the government may elect to use to meet their burden. Neither Chapter 22 nor Iowa Administrative Rule 497-7.11(2) prescribes a single method for the Respondent to meet that burden. Here, the Respondent’s production of the email headers, signatures, and nonconfidential text supports its assertion that it properly redacted only those portions of the communications in which legal counsel was involved in providing legal advice to the Respondent and its employees about a pending legal matter.
For the reasons set forth above, there is insufficient evidence to find probable cause that the respondent engaged in an unreasonable delay, failed to meet their Chapter 22 obligations when part of a recording was accidentally deleted during the transfer process, or that they improperly withheld any records.
IPIB Action
The Board may take the following actions upon receipt of an Investigative Report:
Redirect the matter for further investigation;
Dismiss the matter for lack of probable cause to believe a violation has occurred;
Make a determination that probable cause exists to believe a violation has occurred, but, as an exercise of administrative discretion, dismiss the matter; or
Make a determination that probable cause exists to believe a violation has occurred, designate a prosecutor and direct the issuance of a statement of charges to initiate a contested case proceeding.
Iowa Admin. Code r. 497-2.2(4).
Recommendation
Therefore, because there is insufficient evidence to find Respondent violated Chapter 22, it is recommended the Board dismiss for a lack of probable cause.
By the IPIB Deputy Director,
_________________________
Charisa Flege, J.D.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This document was sent on September 11, 2026, to:
Chelsea Plaster, Complainant
City of Davenport Public Works, Respondent
The Iowa Public Information Board
Under Iowa Admin. Code r. 497-2.2(4) the Board takes the following action:
☐a. Redirect the matter for further investigation;
☒b. Dismiss the matter for lack of probable cause to believe a violation has occurred;
☐c. Make a determination that probable cause exists to believe a violation has occurred, but, as an exercise of administrative discretion, dismiss the matter; or
☐d. Make a determination that probable cause exists to believe a violation has occurred, designate a prosecutor and direct the issuance of a statement of charges to initiate a contested case proceeding.
By the Board Chair
___________________________________
Catherine Lucas
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This document was sent on September 18, 2026, to:
Chelsea Plaster, Complainant
City of Davenport Public Works, Respondent