The Iowa Public Information Board
In re the Matter of: Matthew Rollinger, Complainant And Concerning: Iowa Attorney General, Respondent |
Case Number: 25FC:0217 Dismissal Order
|
|---|
COMES NOW, Charlotte Miller, Executive Director for the Iowa Public Information Board (IPIB), and enters this Dismissal Order:
On December 12, 2025, Matthew Rollinger (Complainant) filed formal complaint 25FC:0217, alleging that the Office of the Iowa Attorney General (Respondent) violated Iowa Code Chapter 22.
Facts
On September 15, 2025, Complainant submitted a Chapter 22 request to the Iowa Department of Education, seeking records related to State Complaint #26-01 and an ensuing investigative report. This request was considered by IPIB in case 25FC:0146, which Complainant voluntarily withdrew on October 28, following the release of responsive records on October 16. Before these records were released, the Department of Education consulted with a particular assistant attorney general in her capacity as their legal counsel, seeking advice about whether they were permitted to release the finalized investigative report to Complainant.
On October 21, 2025, after the release of the investigative report, Complainant submitted a new Chapter 22 request to Respondent, seeking all communications between them and the Department of Education pertaining to the release of the report, including “[a]ny legal advice, review, or consultation provided to the Department concerning the publication, withholding, or modification of the investigator’s findings.”
On December 1, 2025, following the exchange of several additional emails, Respondent provided a preliminary answer, noting that many of the files sought would likely be withheld based on either attorney-client privilege or work product confidentiality. Complainant responded by asking the custodian to “please ensure that any factual material, transmittal emails, or non-legal communications are produced where severable from privileged content.”
On December 12, 2025, Respondent released a 123-page disclosure file, along with a statement that “[s]ix emails across three email chains” had been withheld based on attorney-client privilege. With reference to the December 1 emails, they also “confirm[ed] that no factual, non-privileged transmittal emails, or non-legal documents existed,” beyond what was provided in the disclosure.
Later the same day, Complainant replied by sharing a copy of an email dated October 15, 2025, provided to him by the Department of Education in response to a separate records request. The October 15 email was sent by the aforementioned assistant attorney general to two attorneys representing the Department of Education, with the subject “Open Records Request.” The email, in its entirety, reads as follows:
Folks,
We are good to release the first report here. [Other Attorney] has confirmed for me this is solely at your folks discretion and highly factual so we don’t have to worry about precedent.
Thanks,
[Assistant Attorney General]
Respondent replied that this email would have been entitled to privilege and that it was “not a non-legal transmittal email.”
On December 12, 2025, Complainant filed formal complaint 25FC:0217, alleging a violation of Chapter 22.[1] Complainant offered the October 15 email as evidence Respondent may have misrepresented and therefore improperly withheld additional records, as he alleged it was a “factual, non-legal transmittal email” the custodian had failed to acknowledge.
The Department of Education has subsequently clarified that privilege associated with the October 15 email was voluntarily waived in an effort to provide additional transparency to Complainant.
Analysis
Complainant does not dispute that attorney-client privilege may serve as a permissible basis for withholding records in response to a Chapter 22 request. See Horsfield Materials, Inc. v. City of Dyersville, 834 N.W.2d 444, 463 (Iowa 2013) (finding attorney-client privilege could be asserted to withhold emails sought in a Chapter 22 request despite appearing in a different section of the Code, outside the confidentiality exceptions listed in Iowa Code § 22.7). Complainant also does not dispute that the October 15 email could have been privileged, notwithstanding the Department of Education’s voluntary waiver.
Rather, Complainant’s core argument is that the October 15 is evidence which contradicts the respondent’s “categorical” representation that there were no “factual, non-legal transmittal emails” left undisclosed.[2] If the representation was inaccurate, Complainant suggests, this would be sufficient circumstantial evidence to cast doubt on the remainder of the response, warranting a full IPIB investigation. Complainant specifically claims that the October 15 email was a “factual, non-legal transmittal email” because it 1) transmitted a disclosure decision about the report, 2) identified the attorney who had offered her second opinion, and 3) described the underlying report as “highly factual.”
This proposed analysis mischaracterizes Respondent’s representation about “factual, non-legal transmittal emails.” The original use of this language came from Complainant’s own directions to produce “factual material, transmittal emails, or non-legal communication,” after Respondent indicated that records would be withheld based on attorney-client privilege. In other words, the phrase was an ad hoc means of differentiating a category of records Complainant was concerned could be withheld from the privileged communications which he acknowledged would not be produced. Although the records custodian later combined the three terms when she said that “no factual, non-privileged transmittal emails, or non-legal documents” remained, the mutual meaning assigned by the parties did not change.
Therefore, Respondent’s representation about having no additional “factual, non-legal transmittal emails” must be understood to mean that there were no purely factual transmissions which were not entitled to attorney-client privilege, not that there were no emails which contained anything which could be described as a “fact” or “transmittal.”
Turning to the October 15 email, there is no real question about whether privilege would have applied at the time of sending, as the email was a communication between an attorney and her client conveying legal advice about the permissibility and possible ramifications of releasing a particular record. The “disclosure decision” referenced by Complainant (“[w]e are good to release”) was legal advice, not a “fact” or “transmittal.” The “fact” that confirmation came from a particular named attorney – in this case Respondent’s records custodian, who was presumably sought for her expertise in that area of the law – offered support and a second source for the advice. Lastly, the phrase “highly factual” ostensibly refers to the disclosure decision (the “this” which was “solely at your folks discretion”) rather than the underlying report, but it would be within the scope of legal advice regardless, as part of the explanation for why the attorney believed her client could safely release the report.
As discussed in the foregoing analysis, the October 15 email was facially entitled to attorney-client privilege, and its existence did not contradict Respondent’s representations about the lack of any undisclosed “factual, non-legal transmittal emails.” Because there is no other evidence to suggest Respondent failed to provide a complete response to the disputed Chapter 22 request, the complaint should be dismissed for lack of merit.
Conclusion
Iowa Code § 23.8 requires that a complaint be within the IPIB’s jurisdiction, appear legally sufficient, and have merit before the IPIB accepts a complaint. Following a review of the allegations on their face, it is found that this complaint does not meet those requirements.
Because the October 15 email was consistent with the statements of the records custodian in closing the Chapter 22 request and there is no other evidence to indicate the response was incomplete, the complaint is without merit on facial review. Dismissal is required for this reason.
IT IS SO ORDERED: Formal complaint 25FC:0217 is dismissed as it is without merit pursuant to Iowa Code § 23.8(2) and Iowa Administrative Rule 497-2.1(2)(b).
Pursuant to Iowa Administrative Rule 497-2.1(3), the IPIB may “delegate acceptance or dismissal of a complaint to the executive director, subject to review by the board.” The IPIB will review this Order on March 19, 2026. Pursuant to IPIB rule 497-2.1(4), the parties will be notified in writing of its decision.
By the IPIB Executive Director,
_________________________
Charlotte J.M. Miller, J.D.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This document was sent on March 13, 2026, to:
Matthew Rollinger, Complainant
[1] Notably, the complaint was filed around ninety minutes prior to the release of records by the Attorney General’s Office, meaning it was not a response to this disclosure.
[2] Several different variations of this phrase have been used by both parties. For the purposes of this analysis, “factual, non-legal transmittal emails” should be understood to cover all variations, as it was the version used in the complaint and accurately characterizes the disputed language.